Background
The general task of work in knowledge representation and reasoning KRR is, trivially, the representation of knowledge. The domain for which t he representation task has been undertaken is, often, secondary to t he d escription of the o verall task as an exercise in knowledge representation. Thus, the t ask of representing a n d u s i n g m athematical, common sense, visual, language-based, and logical knowledge is lumped" together under the r u bric of KRR for examples of the diversity of goals of KRR see 12 . I will argue that i n n atural language processing a n d u nderstanding t here is a is a strong argument for the language structure and use mediating a n y a ttempt at representation. The t ask of knowledge representation for natural language processing a n d u nderstanding is a knowledge-intensive o n e. To u nderstand a natural language sentence a NLP system must, minimally, b e a ble to represent t he content of the s e n tence in the language of representation. These representation languages have been largely unmotivated with respect to t he n atural language they may be representing. In 12 only six of the t wenty-two KRR systems presented are driven by n atural language processing concerns.
Logic
Logic is a popular choice of representation languages because of is prefabricated syntax, and model-thoretic semantics. However, the syntax and s e m antics of rst-order predicate logic is most de nitely not that o f n atural language. I will argue that i f t he domain of representation is natural language, then the minimally, syntactic form of the n atural language should strongly in uence the representation.
If we contrast the v arious goals of researchers in the domains for which t hese kinds of knowledge are to b e u s e d , w e m ay come t o t he conclusion that t he goals di er signi cantly and, indeed, may con ict. Consider the traditional use of representations based on rst-order logic. Here, we h ave a system that h a s a p o werful, well-understood, inferential machinery but w eak expressive p o wer. Collections of logical formulas do not seem to capture the i n tuitive use of concepts b y p e o ple. This representation for knowledge is unstructured and disorganized. What's missing i s t hat rst-order predicate does not provide a n y special assistance in the problem of what Brachman called knowledge structuring" 6 . That i s , the speci cation of the i n ternal structure of concepts i n t erms of roles and i n terrelations between them and t he inheritance relationships between concepts A ttempts t o incorporate knowledge-structuring i n to t he representation language are typi ed by t he use of frames, or frame d escription languages FDLs. These are structured slot-ller structures representing concepts t hat s t and i n v arious relationships i.e., taxonomic to each o t her. However, this shift into slot-ller structures where the expressive p o wer is greater but t he inferential machinery is underspeci ed, perhaps, goes too far. The cost of knowledge-structuring i s a weaking o f t he inferential machinery available.
Logic is a traditional representational m edium for attempts t o u nderstand n atural language. As a formal language logic has the d esirable property t hat expressions of a formal language can be paired with i n terpretations. Thus a correct" mapping from natural language sentences into logic allows the original sentences to b e i n terpreted. However, the mapping from natural language structures into t he s t andard syntax of logic and from logic to n atural language is unnatural in that t he structure of the n atural language which can be signi cant is usually lost. This is typi ed by t he d e-structuring" of noun phrases that occurs when it is translated into logic. This is a consequence of the a tomic nature of variables in logic and results i n t he separation of constraints o n v ariables from the v ariables themselves. This most often occurs when these constraints are moved to t he a n tecedents of rules that t ype the v ariables. This results i n t he loss of the simple predicate-argument structure of the original sentence being represented.
Goals
This work is based on the assumption that n atural language determines the d esign of a knowledge representation and reasoning KRR system. In particular, I present a KRR system for the representation of knowledge associated with n atural language dialog. I will argue that t his may done with minimal loss of inferential power and will result i n a n e nriched representation language capable of supporting complex natural language descriptions, support for some discourse phenomena, standard rst-order inference, inheritance, and t erminological subsumption. Some o f t he goals of a more natural logic and i t s computational implementation in a knowledge representation and reasoning system are discussed below.
It should possess as much o f t he m achinery of traditional FOPL as possible. It is not an accident t hat logical form representations are popular; it is a consequence of their power and generality.
The m apping from natural language sentences into logical form sentences should be as direct as possible, and t he representation should re ect the structure of the n atural language NL sentence it purports t o represent. This is particularly well illustrated by rule-type sentences, such as small dogs bite h arder than big dogs," where their representation takes the form of an implication whose antecedent constraints specify what t ypes of dog bite harder than another type. This representation, as a logical rule, contrasts with t he predicateargument structure of the original sentence, as below:
8x; ysmallx^dogx^largey^dogy bites-harderx; y By comparison, the representation of Fido bites harder than Rover is more consistent with the original sentence, bites-harderFido, Rover This is so, despite t he i n tutive observation that t he t wo s e n tences have n early identical syntactic structure, and similar meaning.
The
where the v ariable, x, h as its o wn internal structure that re ects i t s conceptualization. Note that I am suggesting something stronger than just restricted quanti cation the a bove could also be represented as 8x : dogx bitesx using restricted quanti ers. Complex internalized constraints t hat is, other than simple type and i n ternalized quanti er structures characterize this proposal for the representation of variables. Thus representation of the sentence: Every big dog that is owned b y a b ad-tempered p erson bites should mimic the representation of dogs bite.
A high degree of structure sharing s h ould be possible, as multi-sentence connected discourse often uses reduced forms of previously used terms in subsequent reference to t hose terms. This corresponds to t he use of pronouns and a n d some forms of ellipsis in discourse. An example of this phenomena i s t he representation of intersentential pronominal reference to scoped terms, e. g., Every apartment h ad a dishwasher. In some o f t hem it had just been installed. Every chess set comes with a s p are p awn. It is taped to t he t op o f t he b o x. examples from 10 . The structures that are being s h ared in these sentences are the v ariables corresponding t o t he i t alicized noun phrases. Logical representations can only model this sharing" by combining m ultiple sentences of natural language into o n e s e n tence of logic. This method unnatural for at least two reasons. Firstly, w h en several sentences must be so combined into o n e s e n tence the resulting logical sentence is overly complex as a conjunction of several potentially disparate s e n tences. Secondly, t his approach is counter-intuitive i n that a language user can re-articulate t he original sentences that h e she represents which argues for some form of separate representations of the original sentences. The problem with logic in this task is that logic requires the complete speci cation of a variable, corresponding to a noun phrase, and i t s constraints i n t he scope of some quanti er. This di culty i s n o t restrictedto noun phrases, indeed it is frequently the case that e n tire subclauses of sentences are referred to u s i n g r e d uced forms such a s t oo" e. g., John went to the party. Mary did, too.
A language-motivated knowledge representation formalism should model this sort of reference, minimally by structure sharing. Any computational theory must incorporate knowledge-structuring m echanisms. In particular, subsumption and inheritance of the sort supported in frame-based and s e m antic network based systems. A taxonomy provides links" that relate more general concepts t o more speci c concepts. This allows information about more speci c concepts t o be associated with t heir most general concept, and information lters down to more speci c concepts in the t axonomy via inheritance. More general concepts i n s u ch a t axonomy subsume more speci c concepts, the s u bsumee inheriting information from its s u bsumers. For atomic concepts, subsumption relations between concepts is speci ed by t he links of the t axonomy. A clear example of subsumption in natural language is the use of descriptions such a s person that has children subsuming person that has a son. I f o n e w ere told: People that have children are happy, then it follows that People that have a son are happy. T h e i n tuitive i d ea is that more general descriptions should subsume more speci c descriptions of the same sort, which i n t urn inherit attributes from their more general subsumers.
ANALOG
I h ave presented some general arguments for considering t he use of a more natural" with respect to language logic for the repesentation of natural language sentences. I have also presented some c haracteristics of natural language that a knowledge representation and reasoning system should support. In the full paper I will clarify the motivations for this work with speci c examples, present a n a l ternative representation for simple unstructured variables which i n volves according v ariables potentially complex internal structure, and reify the logic of these variables. This involves providing a syntax and s e m antics of the logic of structured variables. The syntax of the logic is speci ed by a complete d e nition of a propositional semantic network representation formalism an augmentation of 14 . The implemented system is called ANALOG A NAtural LOGic 4, 5 , 2 , 1 , 3 .
The representations that t hat result from using t hese structured variables have t he following advantage:
The representation of numerous types of quantifying expressions, using structured variables, is more natural" than typical logics, because the m apping o f n atural language sentences is direct. Thus parsing a n d generation of natural language sentences particularly those involving restrictive relative clauses is simpli ed. With structured variables that contain their own binding structures quanti ers, no open sentences are possible. This is consistent with n atural language where few, if any, o pen sentences occur minimally, noun phrases are, by d e nition, typed. Sentences involving non-linear quanti er scopings, such as branching quanti ers and the donkey sentences can be represented 11, 9 because quanti er scope speci cation is internal to t he structured variable. Subsumption can be de ned syntactically it terms of the structure of structured variables. For example, from a rule representing Every boy loves a girl all rules involving more restricted boys follow directly by v ariable subsumption e. g., Every boy that owns a red c ar loves a girl. This sort of subsumption can be de ned without t he traditional T-Box a n d A-Box d i s t inction as in, for example, 7, 8 and h as a great deal of utility. Since the u nderlying representation is semantic network-based the representation of sentences that s h are structures e. g., Every farmer that owns a donkey beats it. His wife does too. i s b o t h possible and reasonable. An example of the capabilities of the ANALOG system for NLP is given in Figure 1 . ANALOG includes a generalized augmented transition network GATN natural language parser and generation component linked up to t he knowledge base based on 13 . A GATN grammar speci es the translation generation of sentences involving complex noun phrases into from ANALOG structured variable representations.
: Every man is mortal I understand that every man is mortal.
: Who is mortal
Every man is mortal.
: Is any rich man mortal Yes, every rich man is mortal.
: John is a man I understand that John is a man.
: Is John mortal
Yes, John is mortal.
: Who is mortal
John is mortal and every rich man is mortal and every man is mortal.
: Are all rich young men that own some car mortal Yes, every young rich man that owns some car is mortal.
: Any rich young man that owns any car is happy I understand that every young rich man that owns any car is happy. 
